crypto_verify16,
crypto_verify32,
crypto_verify64 —
timing-safe data comparison
#include
<monocypher.h>
int
crypto_verify16(
const
uint8_t a[16],
const uint8_t b[16]);
int
crypto_verify32(
const
uint8_t a[32],
const uint8_t b[32]);
int
crypto_verify64(
const
uint8_t a[64],
const uint8_t b[64]);
Cryptographic operations often require comparison of secrets or values derived
from secrets. Standard comparison functions like
memcmp() tend to exit when they find the first
difference, leaking information through timing differences.
As an example, say a message authentication code (MAC) is sent over the network
along with a message, but the correct MAC is secret. If the attacker attempts
a forgery, one does not want to reveal “your MAC is wrong,
and it took 384 microseconds to tell”. If
the next attempt takes 462 microseconds instead, it tells the attacker they
just guessed a few bytes correctly. That way, an attacker can derive the
correct MAC, and sucessfully forge a message. This has lead to practical
attacks in the past.
To avoid such catastrophic failure,
crypto_verify16(),
crypto_verify32() and
crypto_verify64() provide comparison functions
whose timing is independent from the content of their input. They compare the
first 16, 32, or 64 bytes of the two byte arrays
a and
b.
When in doubt, prefer these over
memcmp().
These functions return 0 if the two memory chunks are the same, -1 otherwise.
intro(3monocypher)