Boring crypto that simply works

hiding of X25519 public keys

#include <monocypher.h>

crypto_curve_to_hidden(uint8_t hidden[32], const uint8_t curve[32], uint8_t tweak);

crypto_hidden_to_curve(uint8_t curve[32], const uint8_t hidden[32]);

crypto_hidden_key_pair(uint8_t hidden[32], uint8_t secret_key[32], uint8_t seed[32]);

These functions allow obfuscating X25519 public keys by making them appear effectively indistinguishable from random noise. This is of interest for key exchange protocols that require indistinguishability from randomness, such as padded uniform random blobs (PURBs). They are intended for ephemeral (short-lived, possibly just one-time) X25519 keys, not for long-term public keys. After an initial key exchange involving hidden keys, subsequent key exchange messages should be encrypted instead; see, for example, the Noise Protocol Framework. This is an . Unless you are implementing an protocol that requires indistinguishability of all communications from random noise, consider crypto_x25519() instead. Both this family of functions and crypto_x25519() should be used as a building block to implement a key exchange protocol.

For understanding what these functions do, it is important to note that a “public key” in this context refers to a . This also means that these functions are not compatible with crypto_sign() and related functions.

() takes a public key curve and a tweak, hiding the public key so that it is effectively indistinguishable from random noise. Note that only crypto_x25519_dirty_fast() or crypto_x25519_dirty_small() can generate a suitable public key; the crypto_x25519() function is insufficient. The tweak must be chosen at random. Even then, this operation fail because not all curve points are capable of being hidden. In this case, crypto_curve_to_hidden() must be tried again with a new key pair, though tweak does not need to be changed. On average, two attempts are needed. Once a suitable public key has been found, crypto_curve_to_hidden() always succeeds for it. Given the same values for tweak and curve, crypto_curve_to_hidden() yields the same output value hidden.

() performs the inverse operation: It decodes a hidden point to a curve point on Curve25519.

() is a convenience function that generates a secret key and its corresponding public key, which is effectively indistinguishable from random noise, from a random seed. because it may take many failures until a key pair could be generated successfully. crypto_hidden_key_pair() uses crypto_x25519_dirty_fast() internally; if code size is an important concern, its functionality can be replicated with crypto_x25519_dirty_small() instead.

The arguments are:

A point on the curve which is a Curve25519 public key generated with either crypto_x25519_dirty_fast() or crypto_x25519_dirty_small().
The hidden encoding of a point on the curve which is effectively indistinguishable from random.
The secret key that was generated from the given seed.
A 32-byte random number from which to derive a key pair. See intro() for advice about generating random bytes (use the operating system's random number generator). The seed is wiped automatically.
A 1-byte random number, which influences the final output of ().

The hidden and curve arguments may overlap or point at the same buffer.

crypto_curve_to_hidden() returns 0 on success and -1 if the given curve argument is unsuitable for hiding.

crypto_hidden_to_curve() and crypto_hidden_key_pair() return nothing. They cannot fail.

Generate a key pair manually using crypto_x25519_dirty_small() instead of its fast variant:

uint8_t sk  [32]; /* Secret key output        */
uint8_t pk  [32]; /* Hidden public key output */
uint8_t tweak;    /* Random tweak input       */
arc4random_buf(&tweak, 1);
for (;;) {
    arc4random_buf(sk, 32);
    crypto_x25519_dirty_small(pk, sk);
    if (crypto_curve_to_hidden(pk, pk, tweak) == 0)
/* Now save the secret key and send the hidden public key. */

Performing a key exchange with the other party's public key having been hidden:

uint8_t hidden_pk [32]; /* Their hidden public key   */
uint8_t their_pk  [32]; /* Their unhidden public key */
uint8_t your_sk   [32]; /* Your secret key           */
uint8_t shared_key[32]; /* Shared session key        */
crypto_hidden_to_curve(their_pk, hidden_pk);
crypto_x25519(shared_key, your_sk, their_pk);
/* Wipe secrets if they are no longer needed */
crypto_wipe(your_sk, 32);

crypto_x25519(), crypto_x25519_dirty_small(), intro()

These functions implement the Elligator 2 mapping for Curve25519. This mapping is incompatible with both the hash-to-curve Internet draft and the implementation of Elligator 2 in libsodium. Elligator 2 was described in: Daniel J. Bernstein, Mike Hamburg, Anna Krasnova, and Tanja Lange, Elligator: Elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings, Association for Computing Machinery, CCS '13: Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security, pp. 967–980, 2013.

The crypto_curve_to_hidden(), crypto_hidden_to_curve(), and crypto_hidden_key_pair() functions first appeared in Monocypher 3.1.0.

The secret keys for the public keys fed into crypto_curve_to_hidden() rather than deterministically. Otherwise, the timing information given by the required number of retries also leaks information on the secret keys.

These functions build highly difficult-to-analyse protocols but are insufficient by themselves: Other metadata, such as the number of bytes sent in a packet or the size of the 32-byte random looking string that represents the curve point itself, can be very strong indicators of the use of cryptography. Consider using appropriate padding algorithms, such as PADME, and obscure other metadata as much as possible.

February 13, 2022 Debian